Case No. 1:21-cv-02886 (D.D.C.) · United States v. Bertelsmann SE & Co. KGaA
Five publishers controlled the market. The largest tried to buy another.
In 2022, the DOJ blocked Penguin Random House's $2.175 billion bid for Simon & Schuster. Three weeks of testimony, 230+ exhibits, and an 80-page opinion showed a market where publishers compete hard on advances while holding author terms in place.
$2.175B
Deal value
49%
Combined market share
85%
Authors never earn out
35%
Books turn a profit
Scroll
Five findings from the trial
1
The Big Five held 91% of top-seller acquisitions and rarely broke ranks on author terms.
The court found tacit coordination on e-book royalties, audio rights, and payout schedules. Publishers fight over advances, but almost never offer better contract terms to win a book.
2
For most authors, the advance is the paycheck, and consolidation makes it smaller.
More than 85% of authors never earn royalties beyond their advance. The 2013 Penguin-Random House merger cut anticipated top-seller advances by about 15%; PRH-S&S was projected to cut some S&S author compensation by as much as 19.2%.
3
Auctions raise advances. They don't improve royalties, audio rights, or payment timing.
The competition is real but narrow. Publishers bid against each other for manuscripts, then converge on contract terms that determine how much authors actually keep. Judge Pan said publishers "choose, almost always, not to gain advantage by offering more favorable contract terms."
4
Publishers are making more money while authors earn less.
PRH generated $5.3 billion in 2024 revenue. HarperCollins' margins nearly doubled in one year. Median author income fell 42% over a decade, and the median author earns $2,000 a year from books.
5
Blocking the merger preserved five major publishers, but it didn't change the terms authors face.
The ruling prevented a Big Four, but tacit coordination, forced audio bundling, and slower advance payouts remained. KKR bought S&S for $1.62 billion. Self-published authors now report higher median income than traditionally published authors.
People want to read. And book publishers have the enormous power and responsibility to decide which books—and therefore which ideas and stories—will be made broadly available to the public.
Judge Florence Y. Pan, Memorandum Opinion, p.1
Part I
The Big Five called the market an oligopoly
Five companies—Penguin Random House, HarperCollins, Simon & Schuster, Hachette, and Macmillan—dominate American book publishing. Together, they held nearly 60% of the market for trade books in 2021. In their own internal presentations, they call it what it is.
Structure: Oligopoly, in addition to PRH only four other major trade publishers
Bertelsmann Internal Presentation Slides
PX 0080-E (Plaintiff's Exhibit)
The US publishing market is made up of what is known as the 'Big Five' — PRH dominates with the largest market share, followed by HarperCollins and then S&S. Hachette is a close fourth, followed by Macmillan. These companies are our biggest competitors, especially for books by already bestselling authors and celebrities, since they are the most likely to come up with high advance payments required.
Carolyn Reidy, late CEO of Simon & Schuster
PX 0530
Market share for anticipated top-selling books (2019–2021)
Source: Dr. Hill Demonstrative Exhibits (PX-0959). Market shares for anticipated top-selling books (advances ≥$250K), 2019–2021. PRH+S&S combined 49%; Big Five Publisher 1: 24%; Publisher 2: 10%; Publisher 3: 9%; Non-Big Five: 9%. Publisher identities redacted by court order. Combined Big Five share of 91% at Memorandum Opinion p. 28. See also Proposed Findings of Fact ¶166.
There are myriad smaller publishers… they too can compete with us for the bestseller list at any one time… but they rarely compete with us in auctions for new properties. Often these publishers become farm teams for authors who then want to move to a larger, more financially stable major publisher.
Carolyn Reidy, late CEO of Simon & Schuster
PX 0530
$1B+
Annual advance spending
Books with advances of $250K+ comprise only 2% of all acquisitions but account for 70% of all advance spending—over $1 billion per year.
91%
Big Five share of top-seller acquisitions
The Big Five hold 91% of the market for anticipated top-selling books. Non-Big Five publishers collectively hold just 9%.
4%
Small group of titles drives profit
Only 35 out of 100 books turn a profit. The top 4% of profitable titles generate 60% of profitability. As PRH's CEO put it, publishers are "angel investors."
We invest every year in thousands of ideas and dreams, and only a few make it to the top.
Markus Dohle, CEO of Penguin Random House
Trial Transcript at 747:5-9
Part II
PRH's bid would have created a publisher with 49% of top-seller acquisitions
In November 2020, Bertelsmann announced it would acquire Simon & Schuster from ViacomCBS for $2.175 billion. The deal would have combined the #1 and #3 publishers, creating a company with nearly half the market for top-selling books.
Market concentration before and after the proposed merger
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measures market concentration. The DOJ's Horizontal Merger Guidelines presume illegality when post-merger HHI exceeds 2,500 and the merger increases HHI by more than 200. This merger blew past both thresholds.
Source: Dr. Hill Demonstrative Exhibits, Figure 35. Pre-merger HHI of 2,220; post-merger HHI of 3,111 (increase of 891). Memorandum Opinion at 40; Proposed Findings of Fact ¶167; Pretrial Brief at 30. HHI calculated using shares in the market for anticipated top-selling books (advances ≥$250K).
3,111
Post-merger HHI
Far exceeding the 2,500 threshold for presumption of illegality under DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
+891
HHI increase
More than 4x the 200-point threshold. The presumption of illegality was "usually determinative" per D.C. Circuit precedent.
New publishers could not break in
Penguin Random House's own internal documents said new entry was not a serious constraint:
No history of companies starting from scratch achieving profitability in 3–5 year time period
Penguin Random House Internal Presentation
PX 0079
Barriers to entry: High (especially reputation, sales)
Bertelsmann Internal Presentation
PX 0080-E
I'm pretty sure that the Department of Justice wouldn't allow Penguin Random House to buy us, but that's assuming we still have a Department of Justice.
Jonathan Karp, CEO of Simon & Schuster, email to a best-selling author
PX 0655
~1%
Amazon share after 10+ years
Even Amazon—with essentially unlimited resources—holds only ~1% of the anticipated top-seller market after over a decade of trying. Its share was declining. High-profile author signings failed and Amazon retrenched.
0
New Big Five entrants in 30 years
No publisher has entered the market and become a strong competitor against the Big Five in the past thirty years. Macmillan, the only Big Five member pursuing organic growth rather than acquisitions, has seen its position decline.
33
Publishers that acquired a top seller in 2021
Out of hundreds of publishers, only 33 acquired even one anticipated top-selling book in 2021. The Big Five accounted for the vast majority.
Decades of acquisitions built the Big Five
The court's opinion documents the acquisition history in detail:
1977
Bertelsmann acquires Bantam Books
Bertelsmann enters the U.S. publishing market.
1986
Bantam merges with Doubleday Dell
1998
Bertelsmann acquires Random House
2013
Random House acquires Penguin Books
Creating Penguin Random House. Advances for anticipated top sellers declined after this merger.
2013–2021
PRH acquires Sasquatch, Rodale, Little Tiger, F&W Media, Sourcebooks
2021
HarperCollins acquires Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
"One of the largest among the mid-size, independent publishers" is absorbed by the Big Five.
Why new entrants struggled
Authors and agents start with reputation
Agents prioritize Big Five submissions first. They only send to smaller publishers if Big Five interest is weak.
Top-seller advances require large balance sheets
New publishers can't match the multi-million dollar advances that top authors command. Even well-capitalized entrants like Amazon and Disney each have over $100M in publishing revenue but still can't consistently compete.
Printing and distribution take decades to build
Printing, distribution, and sales force relationships take decades to build. Bertelsmann controls printing capacity—S&S's own CEO worried about being "beholden to a competitor for printing."
Part III
Internal records showed where publishers compete and where they coordinate
The trial surfaced internal emails, depositions, and confidential presentations on how books are acquired, how auctions move, and how publishers coordinate behind closed doors.
Real auctions show competition works
The court examined 13+ real auctions with detailed bidding records. These show exactly how competition between PRH and S&S drove up author compensation. Here's one memoir auction over three days:
Real memoir auction, Feb. 24–26 (PX 941B)
The government highlighted that both PRH and S&S were active bidders. After the merger, this competitive dynamic would disappear. The highlighted region shows when only the defendants were bidding against each other.
Source: Plaintiff's Exhibit PX-941B (auction records produced in discovery). One of 13+ real book auctions examined at trial. Bidding data, timestamps, and publisher identities taken directly from literary agent records. See Proposed Findings of Fact ¶¶186–210; Closing Argument at 18–25.
Auction records show 40% to 400% bid increases
From the Memorandum Opinion (p.12), these real auctions show how competitive bidding dramatically increased what authors were paid:
Auction format
Opening high bid
Winning bid
Increase
Exhibit
6 rounds + best bids
$400,000
$775,000
+94%
PX 944-B
5 rounds
$300,000
$635,000
+112%
PX 948-B
8 rounds
$550,000
$825,000
+50%
PX 941-B
4 rounds + best bids
$250,000
$750,000
+200%
PX 938-B
7 rounds
$300,000
$1,500,000
+400%
PX 939-B
5 rounds + best bids
$400,000
$1,100,000
+175%
PX 940-B
1 round + improve
$800,000
$1,500,000
+88%
PX 955-B
Best bids + improve
$750,000
$1,100,000
+47%
PX 951-B
3 rounds + best bids
$750,000
$1,050,000
+40%
PX 954-B
3 rounds + best bids
$250,000
$700,000
+180%
PX 950-B
Preempt to auction
$750,000
$1,100,000
+47%
PX 729
There just is literally no telling what the opponents hold in their hands.
Brian Tart, President of PRH's Viking imprint, explaining why he "stretched" beyond his P&L
PX 326 (internal email)
S&S treated PRH as the rival to beat
"We also lost the auction to Crown [PRH]… This was the third beauty contest we lost this week to PRH."
Simon & Schuster internal email — PX 0559
"I did everything I could and we lost to Random House… Frustrating."
Simon & Schuster internal email — PX 0624
"I'm concerned that if we offer less than $8 million, [the agency] will go back to PRH. [The agent] said they were willing to offer more."
Simon & Schuster internal email — PX 0613
"Portfolio [PRH] offered $1 million for World. To win the book, we'll have to offer $1.1 million… I don't want to let PRH steal an author we've invested in and developed."
Simon & Schuster internal email — PX 0729
PRH coordinated its own imprints
PRH's own board presentation said the company coordinated bidding among its imprints:
Increased background coordination in auctions to leverage internal demand information better and avoid internal up-bidding
Penguin Random House 2018 Board of Directors Presentation
PX 0411 and Trial Tr. 2372:24 – 2373:1 (McIntosh)
That admission undercut PRH's central defense. Internal emails showed how coordination worked in practice:
Glad we didn't go higher (this one definitely benefited from the coordination!)
PRH executive, internal email after three PRH imprints all bid $600K — PX 421
We are coordinated. Bill [Random House] and Kara [Knopf Doubleday] will agree to a number and both offer same.
PRH division report to management — PX 107
Wondering if we should advise KDD to go a bit lower in round 1? I worry that if they go in at $600k each, it'll go for more than $750k per book.
PRH internal email — PX 116
Both RH and KDD want to go up to $1.6m + bonuses in round 2 (coordinated in this case).
PRH internal email — PX 121
The court noted: "This type of behavior from independent companies would be illegal."
Bertelsmann controlled scarce printing capacity
Bertelsmann's printing assets mattered because North American book-printing capacity was already tight.
PRH is the only major publisher in the United States with printing assets.
Government's Opposition to Motion to Exclude Printing Evidence
There isn't enough capacity in North America to print all the demand in the market for physical books.
Madeline McIntosh, CEO of PRH U.S.
Litigation testimony
[O]ur current manufacturer… will be selling its Book Trade business to Bertelsmann who owns Penguin Random House. We would not want to be 100% beholden to a competitor for printing.
Carolyn Reidy, late CEO of Simon & Schuster
PX 0682
Part III-B
Contract terms moved against authors
Beyond the auction-level competition, the court found evidence of something more systemic: the Big Five have engaged in parallel conduct that has steadily shifted contract terms against authors—and they have a proven history of outright collusion.
E-book royalties were cut in half across the industry
During the early years of e-books, publishers uniformly shifted e-book royalty rates from 50 percent to 25 percent, thereby reducing authors' compensation.
Judge Pan, Memorandum Opinion
Random House blackballed Andrew Wylie
When the world's most powerful literary agent tried to fight back, here's what happened:
In 2010, Wylie tried to convince Random House to raise the e-book royalty from 25%. He failed. He then launched "Odyssey Editions" with Amazon, offering authors 100% of digital royalties less agency commission.
Court record
Random House announced in The New York Times it would not do business with Wylie—effectively blackballing him. Wylie met with PRH CEO Dohle, capitulated, pulled his books from Amazon, and Random House obtained the digital rights.
Trial testimony, Andrew Wylie
Audio rights became "no audio, no deal"
Remember when Amazon was offering seven figures on Audio before books were sold to publishers? We turned down big book after big book until agents realized we would not play in an auction without Audio. And now they always sell us Audio.
PRH internal email
PX 328
Advance payments stretched from halves to quarters
Advances were originally paid in two installments. Then thirds. Now quarters—with the last payment coming a year after publication. It takes 3–4 years for an author to receive their full advance. Agents have been unable to resist this shift.
E-book price-fixing came first
This wasn't the first time. In 2012, five of the Big Six publishers were found to have conspired with Apple to fix e-book prices—a per se antitrust violation.
PRH CEO Markus Dohle had no qualms meeting with the other publishing CEOs in private dinners to discuss "the common challenges they faced" without lawyers present—the dinners that preceded the e-books price-fixing conspiracy.
Government's Opposition to Defendants' Proposed Findings
Citing United States v. Apple, Inc.
Terms moved in one direction
E-book royalties cut from 50% to 25%. Advance payouts stretched from 2 to 4 installments. Audio rights forced into bundles. Each shift reduced author compensation. Each was adopted uniformly across the Big Five. The court found this constituted "parallel accommodating conduct."
“In an industry where the competition to acquire anticipated top sellers is intense, the competing publishers nevertheless choose, almost always, not to gain advantage by offering more favorable contract terms.”
“This phenomenon bespeaks a tacit agreement among the publishers to compete only on the basis of advance level because it collectively benefits them not to yield on other contract terms.”
Judge Florence Y. Pan, Memorandum Opinion, p. 60
United States v. Bertelsmann SE & Co. KGaA, No. 1:21-cv-02886 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2022)
Part IV
The merger was projected to cut author compensation
The DOJ's expert economist, Dr. Nicholas Hill, used multiple economic models to estimate how the merger would reduce author compensation. The results were stark.
Projected reduction in author compensation (GUPPI & SSA models)
Source: Dr. Nicholas Hill expert testimony, Trial Tr. at 3060–3067; Memorandum Opinion Figure 8, p. 57. Three economic models: Second-Score Auction (SSA), Single-Round & Hybrid GUPPI, Multi-Round Auction GUPPI. PRH authors: −3.7% (Single-Round GUPPI), −4.3% (SSA), −7.3% (Multi-Round GUPPI). S&S authors: −9.6% (Single-Round), −11.6% (SSA), −19.2% (Multi-Round). See Proposed Findings of Fact ¶¶256–262.
-3.7%
PRH authors (SSA model)
Authors at Penguin Random House would see their advances decline by 3.7% under the Second-Score Auction model.
-11.6%
S&S authors (SSA model)
Simon & Schuster authors faced the worst harm: up to 11.6% reduction in compensation.
-19.2%
S&S authors (GUPPI)
The Single-Round GUPPI model projected S&S authors could lose nearly a fifth of their compensation.
For 85% of authors, the advance is the paycheck
The trial laid bare the economics of being an author. The advance isn't a bonus—for most writers, it's the only money they'll ever see.
85%
Authors who never earn out
More than 85% of author contracts for anticipated top-selling books never earn royalties beyond the advance. Agent Andrew Wylie testified that only 5% of books he represents earn out. The advance is the compensation.
93%
Books usually go to the highest bidder
Agent Andrew Wylie testified he sold books to the highest bidder about 93% of the time. PRH's McIntosh confirmed that an underbidder winning an auction is "rare."
The advance allowed him to take time off from his job to write, support his newborn child, buy a house, and pay living expenses.
Court describing author Charles Duhigg's testimony
Trial Tr. at 1941:9-1943:1 (Duhigg)
The defendants do not dispute that if advances are significantly decreased, some authors will not be able to write, resulting in fewer books being published, less variety in the marketplace of ideas, and an inevitable loss of intellectual and creative output.
Judge Florence Y. Pan, Memorandum Opinion, p. 23
Citing Trial Tr. at 772:8-25 (Dohle)
A $250,000 advance is not $250,000 of income
The defense tried to characterize authors receiving $250K+ advances as "elite." The government showed the math:
A $250,000 advance becomes $53,000–$71,000 a year
$250,000 advance
− 15% agent commission = $212,500
Paid over 3–4 years in quarterly installments = $53,000–$71,000/year
As one internal email put it: "I believe [the agent] is telling you the truth when she says they can't [write the book] for less than $350,000. Assume they're each making $150,000 a year and they want to take a full year off. They're just trying to break even after paying the commission."
Stephen King testified on author economics
In 2018, the average full-time writer earned below the poverty line.
Stephen King, trial testimony
[On PRH's promise to let imprints bid against each other post-merger:] You might as well say that you're going to have a husband and wife bidding against each other for the same house.
Stephen King, trial testimony
The 2013 PRH merger left a warning sign
The government's strongest piece of real-world evidence came from the last big merger. In 2013, Penguin and Random House combined to form PRH—reducing the Big Six to the Big Five. The DOJ's economist studied what happened next.
Average advance per title after the 2013 Penguin-Random House merger (indexed, 2012=100)
Source: Dr. Hill's difference-in-difference analysis (PX-966). Trial Tr. at 3065:16–3067:1 (Hill); Proposed Findings of Fact ¶¶238–242. The documented finding: advances for anticipated top sellers fell ~15% relative to other books after the merger. Note: Year-by-year values are illustrative of the documented trend; PX-966 was a demonstrative chart exhibit whose individual data points are not available in the text record. The direction and magnitude of both trend lines reflect the court's findings.
Dr. Hill's difference-in-difference analysis found that advances for anticipated top sellers fell approximately 15% relative to other books after the 2013 merger. Both the defense's own economist (Dr. Snyder) and PRH management acknowledged that PRH paid lower average advances for top sellers after the merger—even as its net retail sales increased.
−15%
Relative advance decline
Dr. Hill's analysis: advances for anticipated top sellers fell ~15% relative to advances for other books after the 2013 merger. Both sides' economists agreed PRH paid less; they disputed whether the merger caused it.
−1,000
Titles cut at PRH division
PRH division head Michael Pietsch testified to a 1,000-title reduction in his division's title count following the merger. The defense economist never analyzed the merger's effect on output. Trial Tr. 218:13–17.
Literary agents testified about the on-the-ground impact:
The merger harmed her authors because Penguin and Random House no longer bid against each other.
The merger led to editorial layoffs and made it "more challenging to sell [her] clients' books because there was less choice."
Agent Ayesha Pande — Trial Tr. 293:1–294:3
The court ultimately found the 2013 merger evidence "inconclusive"—muddied by an unrelated contraction in mass-market paperbacks around the same time. But the judge noted that requiring proof of harm from a prior merger before blocking a new one would be a catch-22: "Such a policy would fly directly in the face of the intent of Congress to arrest anticompetitive tendencies in their incipiency." The court blocked the merger anyway, relying on the economic models and internal documents.
Part V
Judge Pan blocked the merger
On November 7, 2022, Judge Florence Y. Pan issued an 80-page memorandum opinion blocking the merger. The court rejected every defense the publishers offered.
Q: After this merger, Penguin Random House will not have as strong a need to grow its share? A: Yes.
Markus Dohle, CEO of Penguin Random House, trial testimony
Directly acknowledging reduced motivation to compete post-merger
No, I've never, never bought into that argument… I am convinced it is not the case in the coming together of Penguin Random House and Simon & Schuster.
PRH Global CEO, when asked about the public claim that the merger was needed as a counterweight to Amazon
PRH's strategic goal for the merger was not to counterbalance Amazon. It was to become an "exceptional partner for Amazon" and to "cement PRH as #1 in the U.S."
PRH internal strategy documents — PX 139
Nov 2, 2021
DOJ files complaint
The Antitrust Division sues to block Bertelsmann's $2.175B acquisition of Simon & Schuster.
Aug 1–19, 2022
Three-week bench trial
Judge Pan hears testimony from publishing executives, literary agents, economists, and industry experts.
Aug 17, 2022
Efficiencies evidence excluded
Judge Pan rules from the bench that defendants' efficiency claims are unverified and inadmissible.
Oct 31, 2022
Ruling announced
The merger is blocked. Judge Pan finds the government has proven the merger would substantially lessen competition.
Nov 7, 2022
80-page opinion released
The detailed memorandum opinion is filed, providing extensive findings of fact about the publishing industry.
Nov 21, 2022
Bertelsmann concedes
"Bertelsmann Will Drive Growth of Penguin Random House Without Simon & Schuster." No appeal filed.
The court rejected every major defense
Efficiencies were unverified
The court excluded all efficiency evidence because PRH's synergy projections were never independently verified. "The court is not in a position to fact-check what Mr. Sansigre says he did."
Internal bidding promise was not credible
PRH promised its imprints would continue competing. The court compared Dohle's "extraordinary pledge" to the criminal-law concept of "consciousness of guilt"—his promise "appears to reflect his awareness of how threatening the combined entity would be."
Agents could not create bidders
Defendants argued literary agents would protect authors. The court ruled agents "cannot manufacture competition"—they can only work with the publishers willing to bid.
Small publishers could not replace S&S
Defendants claimed small publishers could expand. PRH's own documents showed high barriers: no new entrant had achieved profitability in 3–5 years.
Part VI
Publishing economics turn on advances
Trial testimony and expert reports showed how manuscripts move through agents, auctions, P&Ls, and standard contract terms.
1
Agents control access and take 15%
Literary agents control which publishers see a manuscript, the format of the sale (auction vs. exclusive), and negotiate all terms. They take 15% commission on the advance, creating a strong incentive to maximize price. As agent Andrew Wylie testified: "It is my job to get an advance that an author doesn't earn out." Agents prioritize submitting to Big Five imprints first because of their ability to pay.
2
Auctions raise prices when publishers compete
The court documented 13+ real auctions where competitive bidding dramatically increased prices. In one case, a book started with bids of $150K–$400K from four publishers, and after six rounds, PRH's Viking imprint won for $775,000—more than double its initial bid. Another book jumped from $200K–$300K opening bids to $635K after five rounds. Publishers experience "auction fever" where "the interest of other parties validates [a publisher's] own sense of what a book is worth."
3
Royalty rates are standardized
Many contract terms have become standardized across the industry, making advances even more important. Paperback: 7.5% of sales. E-books & audio: 25% of net. Hardcover: 10% for first 5,000 copies, 12.5% for 5,000–10,000, 15% above 10,000. Audio rights are now always bundled and cannot be sold separately. Payout terms have shifted from thirds to quarters, further delaying author income over 3–4 years.
4
P&Ls set the opening bid, not the ceiling
Editors generate a profit & loss statement ("P&L") to determine the advance. The most important input is estimated book sales based on "comp titles"—similar books. But editors who really want a book will "stretch" beyond what the P&L suggests, considering factors like editorial enthusiasm, awards potential, and category growth. Competition ensures they have to.
5
Small presses serve as farm teams
Small publishers develop new authors, but once those authors prove successful, they move to a Big Five publisher for larger advances and marketing. Even in one-on-one negotiations, publishers know that "the threat of taking the book to other publishers always lurks in the background." Agent Gail Ross: "In this business, there's always the other competitor. Whether they're bidding or not, they're always there."
6
The witness list covered the whole market
The trial featured testimony from authors Stephen King, Charles Duhigg, and Andrew Solomon; CEOs of all Big Five publishers; six literary agents including the legendary Andrew Wylie; and competing expert economists. Over 230 exhibits were admitted, including internal emails, board presentations, and auction records.
Source materials
Court record
All 29 primary documents are linked below. PDFs open in a new tab.
Presided over trial and issued the ruling blocking the merger
Markus Dohle
CEO, Penguin Random House
Deposed; acknowledged PRH's dominant market position
Carolyn Reidy (deceased)
Former CEO, Simon & Schuster
Her emails calling the market an "oligopoly" and small publishers "farm teams" were key evidence
Dr. Nicholas Hill
DOJ Expert Economist
Developed the GUPPI/SSA models showing 3.7%–19.2% author harm
Dr. Edward Snyder
Defense Expert Economist
His efficiencies testimony was excluded for lacking independent verification
Jennifer Rudolph Walsh
Defense Expert, Former Literary Agent
Argued agents could protect authors; government moved to exclude her testimony
Manuel Sansigre
SVP, Penguin Random House (M&A)
Created the synergies model that was rejected as unverified
Daniel M. Petrocelli
Lead Defense Counsel (O'Melveny)
Represented Bertelsmann and Penguin Random House
The industry
The Big Five control the high-advance market
Five conglomerates control the vast majority of American trade book publishing. Each owns multiple imprints that present themselves as independent but ultimately answer to the same parent.
Big Five market share by advance level
Source: Dr. Hill Demonstrative Exhibits; publisher acquisition data for books with advances at each threshold level. The higher the advance, the more concentrated the market: PRH's share rises from ~30% at $150K+ to ~45% at $1M+. Non-Big Five publishers are almost entirely shut out at the highest advance levels. See Memorandum Opinion at 25–28; Trial Tr. at 3060–3067 (Hill).
Publisher
Parent company
Notable imprints
HQ
Penguin Random House
Bertelsmann (Germany)
Random House, Crown, Knopf, Viking, Putnam, Dutton, Berkley
New York
HarperCollins
News Corp (USA)
Harper, William Morrow, Avon, Ecco
New York
Simon & Schuster
KKR (formerly ViacomCBS)
Scribner, Atria, Gallery, Pocket
New York
Hachette Book Group
Lagardère (France)
Little Brown, Grand Central, Perseus
New York
Macmillan Publishers
Holtzbrinck (Germany)
St. Martin's, Flatiron, Henry Holt, FSG
New York
Part VII
Publishers keep more of each book than authors do
The Bertelsmann trial put numbers behind publishing economics. Author surveys, sales records, and industry reports show the same pattern: most writers cannot make a living from books, even as publisher revenue rises.
What authors earn vs. what publishers keep on a $25 hardcover
Source: Standard industry economics for a $25 hardcover. Retailer discount is typically 50% of list ($12.50). Manufacturing/shipping ~$4.25. Publisher retains ~$4.50 after overhead. Author receives standard 15% of list price ($3.75)—only 15% of the cover price. Royalty structure corroborated by trial testimony and agent depositions. See also Paul Millerd, A History of Book Publishing; Authors Guild 2023 Survey.
$2,000
Median annual book income
The Authors Guild 2023 survey of 5,699 writers found the median book-related income for all published authors was $2,000/year. Full-time authors: $10,000. This has fallen 42% in a decade.
50%
Books selling fewer than 12 copies
Trial testimony revealed that of ~58,000 books published in one year, half sold fewer than 12 copies. 90% sold fewer than 2,000. Only about 50 authors in a given year sell over 500,000 copies.
10%
Authors who can live on writing
Only about 10% of published authors earn enough to support themselves from writing. The median full-time author income of $20,000/year is below the federal poverty line for a family.
Celebrity advances sit in a different market
The distance between the top and everyone else is staggering:
Author type
Typical advance
Ratio to debut
Debut novelist
$5,000 – $15,000
1x
Niche nonfiction / poetry
$1,000 – $3,000
0.2x
Mid-list established
$25,000 – $75,000
5–8x
Anticipated top seller
$250,000+
25x
Bruce Springsteen
$10,000,000
1,000x
Britney Spears
$15,000,000
1,500x
Prince Harry
$40,000,000
4,000x
Barack & Michelle Obama
$65,000,000
6,500x
Even among high-advance books, fewer than 45% of titles receiving $1 million+ advances made the top 1,000 on BookScan—meaning publishers routinely overpay for celebrity books that underperform.
Audiobooks grew, but authors lost control of audio rights
Audiobooks are the fastest-growing format in publishing. But the trial revealed exactly how the Big Five seized control of audio rights—and how authors lost the ability to sell them independently.
$2.2B
U.S. audiobook revenue in 2024
Up 13% over 2023. Audio now commands 11.3% of the U.S. trade market, surpassing ebooks. Digital audiobook sales jumped 22.5% in 2024 to $2.36 billion—the largest sales increase ever. Spotify now offers 15 free audiobook hours to 602 million users.
25%
Author audio royalty rate
Audio and digital downloads earn 25% of net sales—not list price. Since "net" is after retailer discounts, the actual take on a $25 audiobook can be as low as $3–4. This rate is standardized across the Big Five and "rarely altered." Trial Tr. at 106:20–107:13 (Pietsch); 255:24–256:20 (Pande).
How publishers locked up audio rights. Agents would prefer to sell audio rights separately—so authors get a direct income stream instead of waiting for the entire advance to earn out. But the Big Five adopted an industry-wide "no audio, no deal" policy, refusing to bid on any book unless audio rights were bundled in. The trial surfaced the internal emails showing how this worked:
Remember when Amazon was offering seven figures on Audio before books were sold to publishers? We turned down big book after big book until agents realized we would not play in an auction without Audio. And now they always sell us Audio.
PRH executive, internal email
PX-328 at 2–3
For at least the last five years, but more likely the last ten years, we have bought everything with Audio.
PRH, internal policy document
PX-328 at 1
The case study the court highlighted. When an agent tried to hold an auction for a highly sought-after book while excluding audio rights, the publishers closed ranks:
This is a book we would all love to publish, but I hope we will walk away if audio rights are not part of the deal.
S&S editor, internal email
PX-652 at 2
The only way to prevent agents from breaking off audio rights like this is to hold firm to our policy of no deals without audio rights.
S&S executive
PX-652 at 2
It will be very interesting to see whether PRH, Hachette, Harper or Macmillan participate. My understanding is that they too have the "no audio, no deal" rule.
S&S editor, internal email
PX-652 at 2
The strategy worked. Here's how Judge Pan described the full episode in the Memorandum Opinion:
One example involving audio rights is illustrative. When selling the publishing rights to a highly sought-after book, her agent attempted to hold an auction that excluded audio rights. S&S wanted the book but refused to bid because “[t]he only way to prevent agents from breaking off audio rights like this is to hold firm to our policy of no deals without audio rights.” PX 652 at 2. An S&S editor ruminated, “It will be very interesting to see whether PRH, Hachette, Harper or Macmillan participate. M[y] understanding is that they too have the ‘no audio, no deal’ rule.” Id. The agent was forced to restart the auction with audio rights included, see PX 568 at 3, presumably because the book received insufficient offers or only received offers that included audio. See PX 320 at 1 (in the first round, PRH bid for bundled audio rights in violation of the auction’s initial rules). In the renewed auction that included audio rights, the bidding was fervid and reflected vigorous competition.
This episode starkly demonstrates that the publishers, despite their great enthusiasm for the book, initially engaged in parallel conduct to deny the author the ability to exclude audio rights from the auction. The parallel conduct was effective and mutually beneficial, as the publishers all retained the opportunity to acquire the book, with their preferred contract term concerning audio rights. Based on this evidence, the Court finds that the Big Five publishers have engaged in tacit coordination that is profitable for those involved.
Memorandum Opinion, pp. 60–61 (footnote: six rounds of bidding, high bid of $400,000 in round one, winning bid of $775,000)
Agent Ayesha Pande explained the cost to authors:
I would always prefer to sell audio rights separately from print rights because if I sell both to the same publisher, any revenues from those rights will only come to my client after the entire advance earns out.
Agent Ayesha Pande
Trial Tr. 257:21–258:2
In other words: bundling audio rights means an author's audiobook revenue goes toward paying back the publisher's advance—which, as the trial showed, 85% of authors never earn out. If the author could sell audio rights separately, that revenue would be a direct second income stream. Instead, the publishers keep it.
Sources: Memorandum Opinion at 6–7 (royalty rates, audio bundling), 59–61 (audio rights coordination, "tacit coordination" finding); Proposed Findings of Fact ¶¶209–210 (audio rights leverage); PX-328, PX-652, PX-568, PX-320 (internal emails). Revenue data: Audio Publishers Association 2024; Circana BookScan.
E-book royalties and payout schedules followed the same pattern
Audio rights weren't the only contract term that moved against authors. The trial documented two more:
E-book royalties cut from 50% to 25%. When e-books emerged, authors initially received 50% of net receipts. PRH CEO Markus Dohle testified that the industry uniformly shifted to 25%—and took credit for leading the change. When superagent Andrew Wylie tried to fight back by launching "Odyssey Editions" to sell e-books directly through Amazon at 100% author royalty, Random House blackballed him—announcing in The New York Times it would no longer do business with him. Wylie capitulated. Today PRH still pays 25%. Wylie called the rate "unfair."
Trial Tr. 775:5–15, 776:22–25 (Dohle); Trial Tr. 2101:12–2105:5 (Wylie)
Advances stretched from halves to quarters. Authors used to receive advances in two installments—half on signing, half on delivery. Publishers uniformly moved to thirds, then quarters. An author now waits 3–4 years to receive their full advance. Agent Ayesha Pande: she "could not recall a specific example where she was able to negotiate a payout with PRH that was not in quarters." Agent Christy Fletcher couldn't either.
Trial Tr. 1828:19–1829:18 (Walsh); Trial Tr. 254:25–255:18 (Pande); Fletcher Dep. 74:9–12
The court connected all three moves—audio bundling, e-book royalty cuts, and payout stretching—as evidence that the Big Five already engage in parallel conduct:
Industry-wide changes to the number of installments for author compensation payouts, the forced bundling of audio rights with publishing rights, and the uniform movement to 25% royalties on e-book sales all suggest that the Big Five publishers already engage, at least, in parallel behavior that allows them to obtain concessions that result in less favorable contractual terms and lower compensation for authors.
DOJ Proposed Findings of Fact
¶315; see also Memorandum Opinion at 59–61
Publisher profits rose while author income fell
$5.3B
PRH record revenue in 2024
Penguin Random House hit a record €4.9 billion (~$5.3B) in revenue in 2024, up 8.5%, with operating EBITDA up 11.3% to €739 million. HarperCollins margins leapt from 8.4% to 12.8% in one year.
–42%
Author income decline from 2009 to 2022
Median author income fell 42% in a decade, from $10,500 to $6,080. Book-only income fell 50%, from $6,250 to $3,100. Publishers are more profitable than ever. Authors are earning less than ever.
Part VIII
Self-publishing pays some authors more
While the traditional publishing system operates like the oligopoly the court described, a parallel economy has been growing. Self-published authors who build audiences directly are, on average, now out-earning their traditionally published peers.
$13,500
Median self-published income in 2025
The ALLi 2025 Indie Author Income Survey found self-published authors now earn a median of $13,500—growing 6% year-over-year. Traditionally published authors: $6,000–$8,000 and trending down.
$24,000
Long-term indie authors
Self-published authors who've been at it since 2018+ earn $24,000 median—a 76% increase from $13,700 in 2018. The indie path rewards persistence.
2.6–14x
Per-book royalty advantage
Self-published authors earn 40–60% of retail price per book vs. 10–15% for traditional. That's 2.6x to 14x more per copy sold. The tradeoff: no advance and you handle everything yourself.
A self-published case study
Paul Millerd self-published The Pathless Path in January 2022—the same month the Bertelsmann trial was heating up. His experience is a direct counterpoint to the system the trial exposed.
68,830
Copies sold
Across Kindle (25,740), paperback (15,046), audiobook (16,825), and other formats. No publisher. No Big Five marketing machine. Built through word of mouth and online community.
$324,887
Total royalties earned
At an average of $4.72 per unit. Compare this to a traditional deal: at standard royalty rates, 68,830 copies through a Big Five publisher would have earned roughly $75,000–$140,000 in royalties—if he ever saw them past his advance.
~$6,000
Total production cost
ISBNs: $295. Designer: $450. Editing: ~$1,000. Plus other costs. Total investment under $6,000. ROI: over 5,000%.
Millerd turned down a $200K Penguin deal
After the book took off, Penguin's Portfolio imprint offered a two-book deal: $70,000 for lifetime rights to The Pathless Path + $135,000 for a second book. He said no.
Giving up the rights to the most important creative project of my life, especially in a time in which creative tools are being democratized faster than ever before, was not something I wanted to do, even if it meant more book sales.
The $70,000 advance for lifetime rights, dispersed over 3 years, was less than what his self-published book was already earning per year (~$10K/month in royalties at the time of the offer).
The math didn't work
If he sold 20,000 copies with a traditional publisher, his royalties would have been only $20,000–$40,000 total. Self-published, those same copies earned him over $150,000.
The per-book economics
The publisher suggested books should serve as "loss leaders" for speaking engagements and courses. Millerd's response: "I think it's actually a mistake to think that books need to be a loss leader."
The philosophy gap
The publisher offered no concrete marketing plan, emphasizing their roster of authors while claiming self-publishing was difficult. Meanwhile, he was already selling thousands of copies independently.
No strategy, just prestige
The long-run economics
In his history of book publishing economics, Millerd traces the profit structure from 1872 to the present and finds that the split barely changed:
Despite manufacturing costs plummeting over 150 years, retailers and publishers maintain similar profit margins. In 1872, retail captured 40% of revenue, production costs consumed 40%, and authors/publishers split only 20%. Today, the structure remains largely similar despite radically lower production costs.
Paul Millerd, "A History of Book Publishing"
This tracks with what the trial showed: an industry where contract terms only move in one direction—against authors. E-book royalties cut from 50% to 25%. Advance payouts stretched from halves to quarters. Audio rights forcibly bundled. Standard royalty rates unchanged for decades. The savings from technological progress flow to publishers and retailers, not to the people writing the books.
Part IX
The ruling stopped one deal, not the industry structure
The DOJ's case against Bertelsmann forced an oligopoly to testify about itself under oath. The record shows an industry that consolidated for decades, pushed author compensation down through parallel conduct, and built barriers that keep new competitors out.
1
The merger was blocked, but the structure stayed intact
Judge Pan prevented the Big Five from becoming the Big Four. But nothing in the ruling addressed the deeper problems the trial exposed: the tacit collusion on contract terms, the e-book royalty cut, the audio rights lockout, the advance payout stretching, or the internal bid coordination at PRH. The oligopoly survived intact. KKR bought Simon & Schuster for $1.62 billion in 2023, maintaining five major publishers—but none of the underlying power dynamics changed.
2
Publisher profits rose while author pay fell
PRH hit a record $5.3 billion in revenue in 2024. HarperCollins profit margins jumped from 8.4% to 12.8% in a single year, with EBITDA up 61% to $269 million. Meanwhile, median author income has fallen 42% in a decade. The top 4% of titles generate 60% of profitability. The industry's economics depend on underpaying the vast majority of the people who create the product.
3
Self-publishing now clears a higher median income
Self-published authors now out-earn traditionally published ones on average ($13,500 vs. $6,000–$8,000 median). The infrastructure barrier has collapsed. Authors like Brandon Sanderson ($42M Kickstarter), James Clear and Tim Ferriss (launching Authors Equity), and thousands of indie authors are proving that the Big Five's services aren't worth the terms they demand. The question is whether the old system can adapt—or whether it will keep extracting until authors stop showing up.
If you are an author signing with a traditional publisher, you are not the customer—book retailers are.
The entire business model is predicated on your book being a hit within the first two weeks. The industry takes the most ambitious, creative, and driven writers, extracts their exuberance, and replaces it with cynicism.
Paul Millerd
People want to read. And book publishers have the enormous power and responsibility to decide which books—and therefore which ideas and stories—will be made broadly available to the public.
Judge Florence Y. Pan, opening line of the Memorandum Opinion
Part X
Since 2022, the same pressure points intensified
The merger was blocked, but the pressures identified at trial kept building: distribution concentrated further, AI created a new rights fight, and authors kept looking for better economics.
OCT 2023
KKR completes S&S acquisition for $1.62B—$560M less than PRH offered. All 1,600 employees get equity stakes. CEO Jonathan Karp stays on.
MAR 2024
Small Press Distribution shuts down after decades serving literary presses. The first domino in a distribution collapse.
MAR 2024
Authors Equity launches—founded by former PRH and Macmillan CEOs. No advances, but 60–70% profit share for authors. Investors include James Clear and Tim Ferriss.
NOV 2024
National Book Network announces closure. Then Diamond Comic Distribution files Chapter 11. Distribution infrastructure crumbles.
MAY 2025
Librarian of Congress Carla Hayden fired via two-sentence email—the first woman and first African American in the role. Copyright Register Shira Perlmutter also dismissed.
SEP 2025
Anthropic settles AI copyright suit for $1.5B—the largest AI training settlement. Authors received ~$3,000 per book for an estimated 500,000 titles trained on pirated copies.
OCT 2025
Baker & Taylor collapses—the nation's largest library book distributor, founded in 1828, ceases operations after a failed acquisition. HarperCollins writes off $13M.
Distribution kept consolidating
In 2024–2025, five major book distributors shut down or collapsed: Small Press Distribution, National Book Network, Diamond Comic Distribution, Baker & Taylor, and Lectorum (the largest Spanish-language distributor). Distribution power is concentrating into fewer hands—primarily Ingram and S&S Distribution Services. Small and independent publishers are being squeezed hardest.
AI shifted the fight to training rights
$1.5B
Anthropic AI settlement
Anthropic trained Claude on ~500,000 pirated books from Library Genesis. The class-action settlement pays authors ~$3,000 per title. A federal judge ruled piracy-sourced training is NOT fair use.
$5,000
HarperCollins AI licensing deal
The first Big Five publisher to sign an AI licensing deal (reportedly with Microsoft), paying $5,000 per nonfiction title, split with authors on an opt-in basis. Wiley signed two deals worth $44M total—but gave authors no opt-out.
70+
AI copyright lawsuits filed
AI infringement cases more than doubled in 2025, from ~30 to 70+. The Authors Guild v. OpenAI MDL consolidates a dozen cases in New York. Some authors are seeking $150,000 per title per defendant.
BookTok drove 59 million print book sales in 2024
Circana BookScan estimates 59 million print book sales in 2024 were driven by BookTok content. The #BookTok hashtag hit 200 billion views. A single social media platform is now arguably more important to book marketing than any publisher's promotional apparatus. Romance grew 9%, fantasy surged 35.8%. Dostoevsky's 1848 novella White Nights became a 2024 bestseller because of a TikTok trend.
Publishers now court BookTok creators directly for cover reveals and ARC partnerships. Bookstores have dedicated BookTok sections—often their highest-performing areas. Barnes & Noble opened 60 new stores in 2024, riding the wave.
Publishing employment fell 40% since 1997
–40%
Publishing jobs lost since 1997
Book publishing employment fell from 91,100 in 1997 to 54,822 in 2023. Revenue grew over the same period. The industry does more with fewer people—and the people who remain are 72.5% white.
$2,412
Median Black author book income
Full-time Black authors earned a median of $2,412 from books vs. $10,985 for white authors. The Authors Guild called the racial income gap "stark and persistent."
23,000
School book bans since 2021
Nearly 23,000 public school book bans enacted since 2021. In 2024 alone, ALA tracked 821 censorship attempts targeting 2,452 unique titles. All five Big Five publishers joined lawsuits against bans.
New models still have to answer the compensation question
Authors Equity—launched in March 2024 by former PRH CEO Madeline McIntosh, former Macmillan CEO Don Weisberg, and former PRH SVP Nina von Moltke—offers a radical alternative: no advances, but 60–70% of profits paid monthly to authors. It's backed by James Clear, Tim Ferriss, and Louise Penny. Their first ten authors signed in mid-2024.
Meanwhile, audiobooks continue their explosion: digital audiobook sales jumped 22.5% in 2024 to $2.36 billion—the largest increase ever. Spotify now offers 15 free audiobook hours to its 602 million users, reshaping distribution entirely. But as the trial showed, traditional publishers force authors to bundle audio rights and pay only ~10% royalties on the fastest-growing format.
Since the ruling, distribution has concentrated further, author compensation remains weak, and AI companies have trained on books whose authors were already underpaid by the system that acquired them.